The battle certainly seemed more significant at the time than modern history books rate it. Sixty years on it is easy to see the apparent inevitability of what actually happened.
But we need to try and understand what it was like at the time, and to appreciate the great variety of factors that contributed to the outcome—including poor communications and intelligence creating uncertainty, variable weather conditions, the vulnerability and slowness of massive ships, the human weaknesses and strengths of crew and pilots, the limitations of technology and equipment, and the bravery or lack of it of the men involved.
The battle took place in the Coral Sea, in an area separating the Solomon Islands, the eastern tip of New Guinea, and the north-eastern coast of Australia from Townsville to Horn Island. A map of this area appears as part of the battle description later.
This covers an area of many thousands of square kilometres, and for much of the time the opposing forces did not know where the enemy was. Each carrier group sent out planes to find the other, but the limited range of the planes, the limited skills of many of the air crews in ship identification, the often poor weather and the huge areas involved all made it very difficult for the planes to find their targets.
There were basically four major groups of ships engaged in different parts of the fighting over the four-day period. Generally, the larger the ship, the more guns it had, the heavier the armour for protection, the heavier it was, and the slower it became. The one exception was the carriers, which were large, but displaced relatively little water, because they were lightly armed - their role being to provide the launching pad for aircraft rather than to shoot at other ships.
Hence, in battle, all other ships had to protect the vulnerable but essential aircraft carriers. They did this by forming a protective screen around the carrier. The Japanese plan to extend their Pacific control was to set up a base at Tulagi in the Solomons for long-range amphibious aircraft.
At the same time they would take Port Moresby. Control of the port and airfield at Port Moresby would mean that Japanese-held islands would be safe from land-based air attacks, and the Japanese Air Force would be free to attack Queensland ports and airfields at Horn Island, Cooktown, Coen and Townsville.
This would also cut sea links between Australia and the United States, stopping the movement of supplies and troops, effectively leaving the Japanese unable to be challenged in the Pacific area. The Japanese would then launch a devastating attack on the main American fleet at Midway, between Pearl Harbour and Japan, destroying it and forcing America out of the Pacific War.
To achieve this the Japanese would first seize Tulagi in the Solomons. Transports carrying soldiers and escorted by the aircraft carrier Shoho and other warships, would then leave Rabaul, and head around the tip of New Guinea to Port Moresby.
They would be protected by two other aircraft carriers, the Zuikaku and Shokaku, supported by cruisers and destroyers. The plan was for these Japanese carriers to intercept the American naval force from two sides as it entered the Coral Sea in response to the Japanese invasion. American intelligence knew that the Coral Sea action was about to happen — they had broken the Japanese secret naval codes, and were able to move ships into the area to oppose the enemy. But knowing what was happening, and then being strong enough to stop it, were two different things.
A common image of naval battles is ships firing at each other. That did not happen in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The single most important element needed to understand that battle is the fact that warships were vulnerable to attacks by aeroplanes. These planes came from aircraft carriers.
So to defeat the enemy, you first had to destroy the runways that allowed the attacking aircraft to operate from the aircraft carriers. If planes could not be launched or could not land, they immediately became useless.
Carriers could be sunk by aircraft zooming in low and dropping torpedoes, which would hole the ship at or under the waterline; or by dropping bombs, which would damage the ship, and hopefully ignite ammunition or fuel and seriously damage and eventually destroy the ship.
These planes would also fire their machine guns at the target, hoping to cause further death and damage. Fighter planes would also be there to defend the attacking aircraft against other fighter planes launched from the carrier to defend it. The job of these surrounding ships was to shoot down attacking aircraft before they reached the carrier. An aircraft carrier screen. The diagram shows the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown surrounded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers.
The diameter of the "circle" is approximately 3. At the same time, the carrier would zig-zag at high speed to make itself a more difficult target. It would also launch fast and highly manoeuvrable fighter planes to attack the slower and more cumbersome attacking bombers. The Battle area. The numbered circles refer to locations mentioned in the text below. The sequence of events started on 4 May. Due to losses of pilots and planes, another carrier Zuikaku also did not take part in that operation.
Thus, Coral Sea reduced Japanese carriers available for Midway by a third. Eminent U. Four Medals of Honor were awarded at Coral Sea:. Robert J. Cressman, The Official Chronology of the U. Navy in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Naval History and Heritage Command.
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In the early morning Japanese and American reconnaissance places spot their foe almost simultaneously, and scores of fighter, torpedo and dive bomber aircraft are launched from the carriers of both sides.
With only a damaged carrier remaining, Japanese carrier force commander Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi withdraws from the battle, not knowing that a slow fuel leak on Lexington caused by a Japanese bomb will eventually create a massive explosion and uncontrollable fire that will lead to its being abandoned and scuttled. View of the underside of the flight deck structure of USS Yorktown showing the impact hole made by the Japanese bomb that struck the ship during the Battle of Coral Sea, 8 May It now had the measure of the Imperial Japanese Navy and had smashed its aura of invincibility.
The year that began with the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the fall of Singapore and the devastation of Darwin ended with the Allied victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway and Guadalcanal. Though many dark days still lay before them, the Allies maintained the offensive until the end. But Yorktown was repaired in time to join the next clash of the carriers in the decisive Battle of Midway in June After they arrived they commenced to attack the Japanese carrier.
At this stage there were only eight fighters in the air, all short on fuel, with a further nine aircraft having just landed on Lexington and in the process of being refuelled. Perhaps because of the fuel problem, or inexperience, the Fighter Direction Officer in Lexington placed the combat air patrol too close to the ships and at such an altitude that they were below the dive bombers and above the torpedo bombers.
In either case, they could do little to break up the Japanese attack which commenced at Two minutes later Lexington was hit on the port side forward by a torpedo and then a second hit opposite the bridge. The dive bombers arrived after the torpedo bombers and scored at least two hits and several near misses. As a result of these attacks, fuel tanks were ruptured and the ship was on fire in at least four places, and developed a six degrees list to port.
Yorktown was also attacked by the Japanese but managed to avoid the torpedoes, which were launched from only one side, but was hit by one bomb. At about the American strike group began to return. Shortly after this Lexington was rocked by a large internal explosion caused by the build up of petrol fumes. This explosion started new fires which were fed by oil and other flammables.
This fire gradually spread and at the order was given to abandon ship. Lexington was finally sunk by a torpedo from the destroyer Phelps. Fortunately for the Americans the Japanese were not in a position to take advantage of the loss of Lexington. Shokaku was so badly damaged that she had to return to Truk for repairs before going onto Japan.
A warning of what was to come for the Japanese merchant fleet. The second carrier, Zuikaku , was low on fuel and had less than forty serviceable aircraft left. As a consequence of this Admiral Inouye ordered the Moresby invasion postponed and the ships to retire. Admiral Yamamoto however, ordered Tagaki and Goto to pursue the Americans. The Japanese broke off the search on 11 May. Due to the insufficient allocation of forces Yamamoto had missed his chance to destroy a large proportion of the US Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Fletcher returned with Yorktown to Pearl Harbor where battle damage was made good and the carrier prepared for the forthcoming Battle of Midway.
Admiral Crace, who had spent the last few days blocking the approaches to Port Moresby, was apparently not advised of the end of the battle nor of Fletcher's departure from the area. Crace departed the area on the 10 May and sailed for Cid Harbour to refuel from the Australian oiler Kurumba. Shortly after arriving at Cid Harbour he received a signal from Fletcher acknowledging his services in the battle. Finally on 18 May staff at FRUMEL intercepted and decrypted a Japanese message which indicated that the Japanese had given up attempting to capture Port Moresby by seaborne assault and intended to mount an assault overland.
In a sense they are both right. On the Japanese part they managed to sink more American ships than they lost, while the Allies not only prevented the Japanese from achieving their objective, the occupation of Port Moresby, but also reduced the forces available to the Japanese for the forthcoming Midway operations. Against this, on the part of the Americans, must be weighed the fact that the Japanese assault forces remained intact and all that had actually stood in the way of the Japanese and the capture Port Moresby were Crace's cruisers.
The decision by Fletcher to weaken his forces by detaching Crace had proved to be the correct one, even though this may have contributed to the loss of Lexington. While Australians today may scoff at the fears of a Japanese invasion during the fact is that for many Australians during the s that fear was real.
Skip to main content. User menu Content Reports. Search form Search. You are here Home » History » Feature Histories. Battle of the Coral Sea. Artwork designed by Brian Clinton. Used with permission of Australian Postal Corporation, Zero fighters preparing for a sortie on the flight deck of a Japanese aircraft carrier. Marshall Cavendish Library.
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